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Hailed as the most innovative and unique human rights monitoring mechanism at the 
United Nations, the Universal Periodic Review process promises to promote and protect the 
universality of all human rights issues and concerns in an objective, universal, and 
transparent manner. With the interactive dialogue session being at the heart of the review, 
coupled with the possibility of peer States potentially raising any international human rights 
norm to hold States accountable, there is a possible challenge to the universality of human 
rights norms, vocalised by State representatives when certain contentious issues are raised 
during State reviews. Selecting one such issue, this paper uses the issue of Female Genital 
Mutilation (FGM) as a focus to explore whether, and to what extent normative claim of 
universality of international human rights norms in relation to FGM is challenged during the 
State reviews in the first cycle of the UPR process. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
A question that may gander into one’s thoughts when reading international human rights 
law is: does international human rights law make a difference? Professor Douglass Cassel 
emphasises that the importance of this question is obvious as ‘the institutions of international 
human rights law deserve our energetic support only to the extent they contribute 
meaningfully to protection of rights’1 A promise of improving the human rights situation on 
the ground, in all member States, was made by the United Nations Human Rights Council 
(“HRC”) in 2008 in the establishing resolution of the new human rights monitoring 
mechanism, the Universal Periodic Review (“UPR”) process2. The central aim of the UPR 
process is to undertake a peer review of the human rights records of each United Nations 
(“U.N.) member State through an interactive dialogue, once every four years under the same 
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1 Douglas Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference? 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121, 121 (2001).  
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uniform procedure.3 Described by U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon as having “great 
potential to promote and protect human rights in the darkest corners of the world”4, the 
review process has separately been applauded as “one of the most important and innovative 
mechanisms of the Council.”5 One of the primary reasons for the optimism is largely based 
on a significant trait of the UPR process, its universal nature. It is precisely this unqualified 
universalist claim in the work and operation of the review process that forms the central focus 
of this paper. Before setting out the aims of this paper in detail, it is important to define and 
distinguish the two grounds, which the claimed universality of the UPR process is founded 
upon.  
The first claim is based on the universal applicability of the UPR process. It is the first 
human rights monitoring mechanism whereby all 193 U.N. member States are reviewed 
periodically under a uniform process.6 Moreover, each State under review is subject to strict 
formality requirements before, during, and after to ensure equal treatment for every country 
when its human rights situations are assessed.7 Human rights records are reviewed according 
to the States’ compliance with human rights obligations arising from the U.N. Charter, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and any other human rights instruments to 
which the State is a party, as well as any voluntary pledges and commitments.8 The extent to 
which the State under review has complied with its international obligations is recorded in 
three different reports. The first report is submitted by the State under review providing a 
self-assessment of the human rights situation in the domestic context.9 The other two reports 
provide an external account of the States’ human rights obligations: one report is a collection 
of information provided by a number of U.N. bodies,  and the other report is based on 
information provided by stakeholders, such as non-governmental organisations (“NGOs”), or 
other national human rights institutions (“NHRIs”).10 Collectively, the three reports form the 
foundations of the review. State representatives consult these reports to devise questions and 
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recommendations to the State under review at the interactive dialogue session, where the 
State under review is required to provide an instantaneous response.11  
At the conclusion of the interactive dialogue stage, and following brief plenary session at 
the HRC to clarify any pending matters from the interactive session,12 a Final Outcome 
Report is produced which consists of all the comments, questions and recommendations and 
responses provided by the States partaking in the review.13 The recommendations that enjoy 
the support of the State under review will be identified as being ‘accepted’, and those 
recommendations that are not accepted will be ‘noted’.14 As such, no recommendations are 
recorded as being ‘rejected’ by the State under review in the UPR process. 
The second ground is embedded in the normative claim of universality of international 
human rights norms, the promotion and protection of which forms one of the fundamental 
aims of the UPR process.15 This aim is recognised by reviewing the extent to which a State 
under review is in compliance with a number of human rights obligations listed under a 
comprehensive set of human rights documents, including the Charter of the UN and UDHR. 
Nevertheless, as with most claims of universality of human rights norms, the foundations 
upon which the claim of universalism is based on can be challenged. The most significant 
challenge is grounded in the theory of cultural relativism. For present purposes, and at the 
risk of oversimplification, cultural relativism is grounded in the belief that values and beliefs 
embedded in culture should be a - or indeed, the - legitimating factor in assessing the validity 
of international human rights law. At the heart of the theory is an emphasis on the 
significance of culture in influencing and shaping human behaviour and perceptions in 
society.16 It is argued that the influence of culture is so fundamental that an individual’s 
perception of the world is unconsciously conditioned by the standards and beliefs of a 
particular culture.17 On this basis, the cultural relativist critique challenges the international 
normative universalist claim of human rights by arguing that moral value judgments, such as 
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interpretations of what constitutes human rights, are relative to different cultural contexts 
from which such moral judgments arise.18  
With the focus of this paper on the normative claim of universality embedded in the aims 
and operation of the UPR process, and in light of the significant challenge posed by the 
theory of cultural relativism, the central aim of this paper is to assess whether, and to what 
extent, member States adopt positions that affiliate with the cultural relativist position by 
using culture as a foundation to challenge the claimed universality of human rights interactive 
dialogue stage in the UPR process during State reviews. More specifically, this paper will 
explore whether, and to what extent, the States under review use culture as a foundation to 
accept, justify or criticise certain practices when their human rights records were subject to 
review during the UPR process. In the same manner, to obtain a complete investigation of the 
discussions held in the UPR process, this paper will explore whether, and to what extent, the 
observer States that undertake the review made references to culture when approving, 
assessing or criticising certain practices when reviewing human rights records of States. By 
answering the two central questions, the findings of this investigation are valuable in two 
significant ways. First, it will further our understanding of the manner in which the unique 
and innovative review process operates in practice, particularly in light of its fundamental 
aim to promote and protect the universality of all human rights. This is because, the approach 
of this investigation moves away from a solely technocratic and constitutional analysis of the 
UPR process in the current literature 19   toward considering the UPR process as a 
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phenomenon of exploration in itself to ultimately further enhance our understanding of how it 
operates in practice. This is undertaken through a sustained comprehensive analysis of the 
interactive dialogue sessions of the review to understand the States’ positions and attitudes 
adopted when the issue of FGM was the focus of State reviews. Second, and more 
significantly, the findings of this investigation will help form an understanding of the 
possible role and implications of the jurisprudence produced from the first cycle of the UPR 
process has in shaping the universality of the international human rights project.  
In undertaking this investigation, it was difficult to ignore the vast breadth of the potential 
human rights issues and norms that may be discussed during the State reviews. In fact, a total 
of fifty-two human rights issues were discussed over the reviews of 193 States in the first 
cycle of the UPR process. One of the most contentious issues raised during the first cycle of 
review was the issue of women’s rights in the context of female genital mutilation (“FGM”). 
Whilst the practice of FGM is condemned under international human rights law, the practice 
is often justified on the basis of religious and/or cultural values. In light of this discrepancy 
between some domestic laws and the international normative position of women’s rights 
under international human rights law, in this investigation, the issue of FGM will be utilised 
as a focus to assess whether any disagreement on the issue is vocalised during discussions of 
State reviews, with justifications of this practice based on cultural grounds. 
This paper is organised into five sections. First, in a brief yet necessary section, an 
overview of the challenge raised by cultural relativism to a universalist claim on international 
human rights norms will be provided. This theoretical framework will be used to interpret 
and analyse the discourse on women’s rights in relation to FGM. In the second section, the 
issue of FGM and its inherent relationship with culture is briefly discussed and, then, 
contextualised under international human rights law. In the third section, the findings of the 
investigation are presented, which reveal that the overwhelming majority of States formally 
accepted the recommendations issues on FGM. This shows that there is, at least, a formal 
acceptance by the participating States that the practice of FGM should be eliminated. 
However, a closer analysis of the discussions held during the first cycle of review reveals an 
alternative narrative. The findings reveal that the majority of States on appreciating the 
association between culture and FGM, the participating States then went on to adopt one of 
the three different positions during State reviews. The first position adopted by some States is 
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to emphasise the relationship between culture and FGM, and then to suggest to eliminate the 
practice. The second approach adopted by some States used the association between FGM 
and culture to provide a justification for the continuance of the practice. Whilst the third 
approach adopted by some States drew upon the relationship between FGM and culture as a 
basis to suggest reforms to the State under review. In the fourth section, using the theoretical 
framework adopted for this investigation, the paper will provide an analysis on the findings 
of the investigation and the implications of the different positions adopted by the States. The 
final section offers two main conclusions based on the findings and analysis of the 
investigation. First, that the extent to which the universality of human rights is promoted is 
contingent on the States participating in the review and the human rights issue being 
discussed. Second, an unchecked challenge of universalism expressed by some States from a 
form of cultural relativism threatens not only the creditability of the UPR process, but could 
potentially question the very infrastructure of international human rights norms.  
II. Questioning the ‘universality’ of the UPR process from a cultural relativist perspective 
 
One key reason for the renowned optimism surrounding the UPR process was based 
on its universal nature. As noted above, this is based on two grounds: the first being the 
universal applicability of the process as all member States are subject to review. The second 
aspect to its universal nature is embedded in the aims and operation of the process, which is 
its normative claim of universality of all international human rights norms. Before 
understanding the critique of cultural relativism, it is important to briefly define and 
understand the concept being critiqued; in this case, the claim of universality, and how this 
normative claim is embedded in the work and operation of UPR process.  
At the heart of any aim of achieving universal human rights lies the assumption that 
human rights are the inherent right of every human being, which transcend all national and 
cultural boundaries.20 Amongst the various forms of universalisms,21 the aims and objectives 
of the UPR process is largely underpinned by what is sometimes referred to as the 
international normative, or legal, universalist claim on human rights. This form of 
universalism grounds its claim on two fundamental grounds.  
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First, international normative universality refers to “the system of normative 
standardisation that was launched by the UDHR” and expanded through the numerous human 
rights treaties, conventions, resolutions and other international human rights instruments 
produced by the U.N.22 For instance, Jack Donnelly terms this form of universalism as 
“international legal universality”, which aims to promote universality of international human 
rights norms on the grounds that they have been accepted by almost all States as binding 
obligations under international law.23. Donnelly argues the vast expansion of the project of 
international human rights law, evidenced by some human rights documents attaining the 
international customary law, is used as a catalyst to further the ultimate goal of universality 
of international human rights norms.24 Aspects of this rationale is reflected in the UPR 
process as observer States are obligated to draw upon a comprehensive list of international 
human rights obligations by enlisting the UN Charter and the UDHR as one of a number of 
standards against which a States’ records will be reviewed. In this way, States undertaking 
the reviews in the UPR process are not restricted to discussing or making recommendations 
on international human rights norms to which the States under review have adopted. Second, 
the normative claim of universality of international norms is further substantiated on the basis 
that member States themselves participate in negotiating and implementing international 
human rights norms at a number of international human rights forums. 25  Thus, the 
universalist claim is made on the basis that not only are the obligations embedded in 
international human rights instruments accepted by the majority of States, but also, States 
globally participate in the interpretation and implementation of these rights at a number of 
international fora. Such State participation in the discussions on the interpretation and 
implementation of international human rights law is guaranteed on a unique platform during  
State reviews at UPR process, with the ultimate aim to ‘promote the universality, 
interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights.’26 Taken together, 
these two fundamental aspects of the review process provide strong grounds to suggest not 
only a presumed normative claim of universality of international human rights norms, but 
also an implicit justification for the promotion and protection of the universality of all human 
rights norms when undertaking State reviews at the UPR process. 
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As with most claims of the universality of human rights, the foundations upon which 
the claim of international legal universalism has always been, and is likely to continue to be, 
subject to persuasive challenges. Arguably, the most significant challenge emanates from the 
theory of cultural relativism, which has been the subject of a number of academic works, 
possibly due to its many pronounced variations of the theory. The form of cultural relativism 
that is often perceived as a direct challenge to international normative universality is the strict 
form of cultural relativism, which has a double observation at the core of this theory. First, all 
values and moral belief systems are held to be culturally specific27; consequently, ‘what is 
morally right in relation to one moral framework can be morally wrong in relation to a 
different moral framework.’28 Second, following from the first belief, strict cultural relativists 
claim that there are such wide variations between the beliefs of cultures that they are 
incomprehensible to one another, with no possibility of constructive dialogue between 
them. 29  In this way, strict cultural relativists advocate an exaggerated claim for the 
‘impossibility of transcultural justification’.30 Applying the central beliefs of strict cultural 
relativism in the context of international human rights law, means that: 
 
local cultural traditions….properly determine the existence and scope of 
[human] rights enjoyed by individuals in a given society [and] no 
transboundary legal or moral standards exist against which human rights 
practices may be judged acceptable or unacceptable.31 
 
Strict cultural relativists thereby challenge the international normative universalist claim of 
human rights by arguing that moral value judgments, such as interpretations of what 
constitutes human rights, are relative to different cultural contexts from which such moral 
judgments arise.32 Thus, should a conflict arise between cultural norms and international 
human rights norms, cultural norms will be given priority as they are considered to be a sole 
legitimating factor in assessing external norms.  
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Ultimately, the dichotomy between universalism and cultural relativism is not a new 
one, and has been the focus of a number of scholarly writings.33 However, as will be 
demonstrated below, this dichotomy has materialised in a more practical form at the UPR 
process since its establishment in 2008. This resurrection of old theoretical dichotomy into a 
new practical light on an international human rights platform calls for a new empirical form 
of investigation which explores whether the cultural relativist perspective has a presence in a 
modern human rights mentoring mechanisms that profoundly advocates the universality of 
human rights norms.  
III. Contextualising Women’s Rights in relation to Female Genital Mutilation 
For the purposes of this investigation, FGM is defined as ‘all procedures involving 
partial or total removal of the external female genitalia…whether for cultural or other non-
therapeutic reasons.”34 International human rights treaty jurisprudence declared FGM as a 
violation of women’s (and girls’) rights under a range of international human rights 
instruments. 35  More specifically, clarification on the issue has been provided in the 
jurisprudence of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(“Committee on the Women’s Convention”) who have stated that FGM, together with any 
underlying cultural justifications that endorse the practice, should be eliminated.36  
Despite the repeated declarations made in treaty jurisprudence that the practice of 
FGM is in violation of international human rights treaties and conventions,37 it continues to 
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be exercised on women and girls in a number of States.38 Those that are sympathetic to the 
practice argue that it is inseparable from the religious and cultural identity of some groups39 
and, therefore, its continuance is often defended as an expression of the traditional and 
cultural values of a particular society.40 Justifications for the practice are sometimes based on 
preserving women and girls’ virginity,41 birth control,42 or to protect the family honour by 
preventing immorality and preserving group identity.43 This inherent relationship between 
FGM and culture, whereby cultural and religious norms are used to justify the practice, is the 
primary reason why it has been selected as the focus for this investigation. This recognition 
was reflected in the UPR process as twenty-nine States adopted a position, which, implicitly 
or explicitly, highlighted the inherent association between FGM and culture.  
The discussion above introduces some of the cultural justifications for the continued 
practice of FGM. With this in mind, the aim of this part of the investigation is to explore 
whether, and to what extent, States adopt arguments from a cultural relativist perspective to 
defend the practice of FGM in the UPR process.  
IV. Findings on the issue of Female Genital Mutilation in the UPR process 
A. An Overview of the Findings on FGM in the First Cycle 
 
In the first cycle of the UPR process, a total of 205 recommendations were issued to 
thirty-six States under review. The recommendations that have been issued and received have 
been categorised according to five U.N. regional groups. These are: African Group 
(abbreviated as “African”), Asia Pacific Group (abbreviated as “Asian”), Eastern European 
Group (abbreviated as ‘EEG’), Latin American and Caribbean Group (“GRULAC”) and the 
Western European and Others Group (“WEOG”).44 The States that received and issued 
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recommendations on FGM have been presented according to regional groups in Graph 1 and 
2, respectively.  
 
 
Graph 1 States under review that received recommendations on FGM  
 
 
 
Graph 2 Observer States that issued recommendations on FGM   
 
Looking at Graph 1 and Graph 2 together, two main findings are revealed. First, it is 
apparent that whilst States belonging to the African and Asian groups received the highest 
number of recommendations, the States belonging to the two groups issued the lowest 
number of recommendations on FGM. Second, States from the GRULAC, EEG and WEOG 
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issued the highest number of recommendations on FGM, whilst the States from the three 
groups themselves received no recommendations on the practice. From this preliminary 
analysis, it can be observed that whilst concerns in relation to continued practice of FGM 
were raised by States belonging to all five regional groups, the recommendations were only 
issued to States from the African and Asian groups.  
In response to the 205 recommendations issued on FGM, a total of 166 were accepted 
by the States under review, and the remaining thirty-nine were noted.45  
 
 
Table 1 Recommendations on FGM that were accepted. 
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Regional Groups No. of States No. of 
Recommendations 
African  19 160  
Asian  5 6 
GRULAC 0 0 
EEG  0 0 
WEOG  0 0 
 
 
Table 2 Recommendations on FGM that were noted. 
 
                                            
45 I have presented the recommendations that were accepted and noted (categorised according to regional 
groups) in table 1 and 2 respectively.  
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Regional Groups  No. of States  No. of 
Recommendations 
African  11 39 
Asian  0 0 
GRULAC   0 0 
EEG  0 0 
  
 
From table 1 and 2, it can be observed that all States belonging to the Asian group accepted 
the recommendations on FGM. On the other hand, whilst the majority of the 
recommendations were accepted by States from the African group, a significant total of 
thirty-nine was noted. This shows that disagreements on the nature of the recommendations 
issued on FGM were all vocalised from States belonging to the African group.  
B. Nature of the dialogue on FGM in the First Cycle of the UPR process 
The nature of the 205 recommendations issued in relation to FGM can be divided into 
four categories, which have been summarised in table 3.  
 
Table 3 Categories of recommendations on FGM. 
 
 
The nature of the responses provided by the States under review can be divided into thirteen 
categories. The comments that were accompanied with recommendations that were accepted 
have been categorised into six categories, and the comments that were issued when the 
recommendations were noted are divided into seven categories. Each response has been 
summarised in Table 4. The categories that begin with the letter ‘A’ were comments made by 
the States under review when the recommendations were accepted. On the other hand, the 
categories that begin with the letter ‘N’ represent those comments that were issued when the 
States under review noted the recommendation.   
 
 
  
WEOG  0 0 
Recommendation  Summary of the nature of the recommendation/Statement   
1 FGM is a harmful cultural practice that is required to be eliminated  
2 To implement incremental reforms to address the practice  
3 Implement laws to prohibit FGM 
4 Comply with international obligations on FGM 
Table 4. Categories of responses on FGM. 
 
 
Figure 3 below provides a pictorial account of the nature of discussions held between States 
on FGM. The representation of the categories of the recommendations is located towards the 
left of Figure 3. Towards the right of Figure 3, the corresponding category of comments made 
in response to the recommendations is provided.  
Category Summary of responses made by State under review 
A1 Accepted recommendation with no further comments  
A2 Domestic Laws already in place against FGM 
A3  Domestic Laws under review on FGM 
A4  Incremental reforms in place to help eliminate FGM   
A5  Cultural justifications for FGM make its elimination challenging 
A6  FGM is not embedded in culture 
N1 Noted recommendation with no further comments  
N2 Laws already in place against FGM 
N3  Laws under review on FGM 
N4 Incremental reforms in place to address FGM 
N5 Cultural justifications hinder the elimination of FGM 
N6  FGM does not exist in the State  
N7 Legislation was not the answer to FGM  
 
Figure 3 Nature of the dialogue held amongst States on the issue of FGM 
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i. Express declaration that FGM is a harmful cultural practice that requires elimination 
Under the first category of recommendations, observer States expressly recognised 
FGM to be a harmful traditional/cultural practice, before suggesting that the State under 
review should eliminate it. A typical example of this recommendation was issued during the 
review of Cameroon when Chile ‘flagged the persistence of deep rooted cultural practice 
affecting women such as FGM…[and] inquired about steps to…eradicate FGM.’46 In another 
example, Mexico issued a recommendation to Ethiopia ‘to eliminate harmful traditional 
practices such as female genital mutilations.’ 47  In total twelve States received 
recommendations of this nature.  
In response, a total of nine States under review accepted the recommendations issued 
under this category. Of these, Djibouti, Tanzania, Liberia and Guinea Bissau all accepted the 
recommendations without providing any further comments. These were categorised as an A1 
response. Botswana48 and Niger provided an A2 response, as they insisted that domestic 
legislation already prohibited the practice. For instance, Niger stated that ‘a law criminalizing 
[FGM] had been adopted in 2003.’49 On the other hand, Cameroon stated that “the reform of 
the criminal code is underway” to address the practice of FGM, and thus provided an A3 
response.50 The delegates of Somalia and Ethiopia51 in response to a recommendation under 
this category provided an A4 response, as both States recognised FGM as a “harmful 
traditional practice”, but went on to highlight the long term policies that were already in place 
to help eliminate the practice.52 For example, Somalia noted that it had implemented 
‘educational awareness campaigns, and a dialogue with traditional and religious leaders, 
women’s groups and practitioners to eliminate the practice of FGM.’53 
                                            
46 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Cameroon of its Eleventh 
Session, ¶ 24, UN. Doc. A/HRC/11/21 (Mar. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Cameroon]. 
47 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Ethiopia of its Thirteenth 
Session, ¶41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/17 (Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Ethiopia]. 
48 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Botswana of its Tenth 
Session, ¶63, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/69 (Jan. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Botswana].  
49 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Niger of its Seventeenth 
Session, ¶48, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/15, para 48 (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Niger]. 
50 Cameroon, supra note 46, at ¶38.  
51 U.N. Secretary-General, Note, Annotations to the agenda for the thirteenth session of the Human Rights 
Council, ¶ 93, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/1 (Jan. 14, 2010).  
52 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Somalia of its Eighteenth 
Session, ¶69, U.N.Doc. A/HRC/18/6 (Jul. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Somalia].  
53 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Somalia: Addendum: 
Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State 
under review of its Eighteenth Session, ¶ 98.21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/6/Add.1 (Dec. 16, 2011) [hereinafter 
Somalia Addendum].  
On the other hand, a total of three States under review noted recommendations issued 
under this category and all provided an explanation for their adopted positions. First, Malawi 
provided an N6 response as the delegates explained that it could not accept the 
recommendation because ‘female genital mutilation…had never been practiced here.’54  
Second, Mali and Liberia55 provided very similar responses as the comments issued 
by the delegates combined an N4 and N7 response. For instance, at the interactive dialogue 
session, Mali stated that the ‘policy on female genital mutilation centred on awareness-raising 
and education and was based on the belief that it was essential to obtain widespread public 
support for the eradication.’56 At the HRC plenary session, the delegate added “that excision 
was deeply rooted in Malian cultural practice”, and so the State has “given priority to public 
education and awareness-raising campaigns rather than the adoption of repressive measures 
whose practical application could not be guaranteed without the support of all segments of 
society.”57 In this way, Mali and Liberia insisted that whilst incremental methods of reforms 
were in place to address FGM, as the practice was deeply engraved in the cultural value 
belief system of the State, legislation against it was not the answer now.  
Overall, it can be observed that when States were issued with recommendations under 
this category, nine out of twelve States under review provided explanations for their positions 
with their responses. What is notable is that no States under review in their responses 
challenged the declaration made by the observer States that FGM was a harmful 
cultural/traditional practice. In fact, it can be noted that whilst observer States drew upon the 
link between culture and FGM as a basis to issue criticism during State reviews, the States 
under review did not use this link to defend FGM on cultural grounds. Instead, seven out of 
the twelve States that were issued with a recommendation under this category made 
references to the laws and policies that were already in place to address FGM.  
ii. Implement incremental reforms to eliminate FGM 
Observer States that issued recommendations under this category began by 
recognising the inherent association between culture and FGM. The observer States then 
went on to suggest that the State under review should implement incremental policies, such 
                                            
54 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Malawi of its Sixteenth 
Session, ¶77, U.N. Doc A/HRC/16/4 (Jan. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Malawi]. 
55  Bente Angell-Hansen (Vice-President & Rapporteur), Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Council on its Sixteenth 
Session, ¶542, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/2 (Nov. 14, 2011). 
56 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Mali of its Eighth Session, 
¶¶30, 54, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/50, (Jun. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Mali].  
57 Alejandro Artucio (Vice-President & Rapporteur), Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Council on its Eighth Session, ¶997, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/52 (Sept. 1, 2008). 
as engaging in a constructive dialogue with relevant stakeholders, with the aim to reform any 
sympathetic attitudes in favour of FGM. A typical example of recommendation under this 
category was when Slovenia suggested that Niger implement “sensitization activities for 
practitioners, families, traditional or religious leaders and the general public in order to 
encourage change in traditional attitudes.”58 A total of sixteen States under review received 
recommendations of this nature. 
In response, eleven States accepted the recommendations. Liberia, Chad, Ghana, 
Tanzania and Senegal all provided an A1 response, as no further comments were provided. 
On the other hand, the States of Togo59 and Uganda provided an A2 response as the delegate 
insisted that ‘Parliament had passed the Prevention of Female Genital Mutilation Act 2009’.60 
Somalia, Niger, 61  Sierra Leone 62 , Eritrea 63 , Ethiopia. 64 , Cameroon 65  and Djibouti 66  all 
provided A4 responses. A typical example is when Somalia stated that it recognized the 
importance of “dialogue with traditional and religious leaders, women’s groups and 
practitioners of FGM to eliminate the practice of FGM.”67 On the other hand, when Congo 
was issued with a recommendation under this category, the delegate provided an A6 response 
insisting that the “the practices of genital mutilation that had been referred to were not rooted 
in Congolese culture.”68  
Gambia was the only State under review that noted recommendations issued under 
this category. Gambia explained there was ‘continued public education on the dangers of this 
practice’ and that ‘legislation was not the answer right now.’69 Thus, the Gambian delegate 
provided a combination of an N4 and N7 response. 
                                            
58 Niger, supra note 49, ¶29.  
59 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Togo on its Nineteenth 
Session, ¶ 67, U. N. Doc. A/HRC/19/10 (Dec. 14, 2011) 
60 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Uganda on its Nineteenth 
Session, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/16 (Dec.22, 2011).  
61 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Niger, on its Seventeenth 
Session, ¶ 23, U. N. Doc. A/HRC/17/15/Add.1 (Jun. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Niger Addendum].   
62 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Sierra Leone, on its 
Eighteenth Session, ¶ 26, U. N. Doc. A/HRC/18/10 (Jul. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Sierra Leone].  
63 Hum. Rts. Council, Universal Periodic Review Rep. of The Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review: Eritrea on its Thirteenth Session, ¶ 72, U. N. Doc. A/HRC/13/2 (Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Eritrea]. 
64 Ethiopia, supra note 47, ¶ 93. 
65 Cameroon, supra note 46, ¶ 40. 
66 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Djibouti on its Eleventh 
Session, ¶ 34, U. N. Doc. A/HRC/11/16 (Mar. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Djibouti]. 
67 Somalia Addendum, supra note 53, ¶ 98.21. 
68 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Democratic Republic of 
the Congo on its Thirteenth Session, ¶45, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/8 (Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Congo]. 
69 Bente Angell-Hansen (Vice-President & Rapporteur), Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Council on its Fifteenth Session, 
¶542, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/60 (Oct. 31, 2011).  
Overall, only one State noted a recommendation under this category.  This makes the 
nature of reforms suggested under this category the most well received recommendations by 
the States under review on the issue of FGM. Even Gambia noted the recommendation did 
not challenge the aim to eradicate the practice; rather, the delegate challenged the nature of 
the reforms suggested to address the practice. Further, it can be observed that of the twelve 
States that provided additional comments in relation to their position, the central focus of 
nine of the State responses were very similar, despite the official position of the State in 
response to the recommendation being different. For instance, the nine States in their 
comments focused entirely on the long-term policies in place, such as public awareness 
programmes and engagement in a dialogue with local leaders, to help eradicate FGM.  
Therefore, the pattern that emerged is that when States under review were issued with 
recommendations that focused on incremental reforms to eliminate FGM, the 
recommendations were not only well received, but also the majority of the States provided 
very similar comments in their responses.  
iii. Implement domestic laws to prohibit FGM 
Under the third category of recommendations, observer States suggested that States 
under review should enact legislation against the practice of FGM. A typical example of this 
recommendation is when the Czech Republic ‘recommended the adoption and 
implementation of legislation prohibiting and criminalizing FGM’ during the review of 
Mali.70 
A total of seventeen States under review were issued with recommendations of this 
nature. Of these, thirteen States accepted recommendations. Senegal, Chad and Kenya 
accepted the recommendations without any further response, and therefore provided an A1 
response. On the other hand, Benin,71 Uganda72 and Iraq insisted the domestic laws were 
already in place, which prohibited the practice, and thus, provided an A2 response. For 
instance, Iraq stated that ‘the crime of female genital mutilation was dealt with under the 
Penal Code.’73 Niger,74 Djibouti,75 Eritrea,76 Mauritania,77 and Sierra Leone78 all provided an 
                                            
70 Mali, supra note 56, ¶16.  
71 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Benin, ¶31, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/39 (May 28, 2008) [hereinafter Benin].  
72 Uganda, supra note 60, ¶22. 
73 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Iraq, ¶48, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/14 (Mar. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Iraq]. 
74 Niger, supra note 49, ¶29. 
75 Djibouti, supra note 66, ¶34. 
76 Eritrea, supra note 63, ¶72.  
A4 response as it placed emphasis on the policies that were already in place to raise 
awareness and engage in a constructive dialogue with the stakeholders involved in the 
practice. Adopting a slightly different position, Guinea Bissau and Somalia79 insisted that the 
domestic legislation on the issue of FGM was under review, and that educational awareness 
policies were being implemented to help discourage the practice, and thus provided an A3/A4 
response. For instance, the delegate of Guinea Bissau stated that ‘regarding the adoption of a 
specific legislation criminalizing female genital mutilation…the process is on-going as the 
country has just started awareness raising campaigns in order to reach the targeted 
population.’80  
On the other hand, a total of four States under review noted the recommendations 
under this category. Of these, Lesotho provided an N6 response as it insisted that “Lesotho 
did not practice female genital mutilation.”81 Gambia provided an N4 response stating that 
“continued public education on the dangers of the practice were under way.”82 Mali83 and 
Liberia both noted the recommendation issued under this category and provided a 
combination of an N4 and N5 response. Also, Liberia and Mali began its responses by 
providing details of the incremental reforms that were in place in its respective States. 
However, the States then explained that the cultural nature of the practice hindered the 
complete elimination of FGM through punitive measures. For example, Liberia at the 
interactive dialogue stage stated that it ‘was engaging all segments of society in inclusive and 
constructive nationwide dialogues to determine the extent and the forms of harmful 
traditional practices, and those dialogues would form the basis for programme planning in the 
eradication of female genital mutilation.’84 Liberia also stated that it “continued to take 
measures to eliminate the practice of female genital mutilation, while respecting the cultural 
rights of citizens to engage in non-harmful, human rights-conscious traditional and cultural 
practices.”85 
                                                                                                                                        
77 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Mauritania, ¶49, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/16/17 (Jan. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Mauritania]. 
78 Sierra Leone, supra note 62, ¶26.  
79 Somalia, supra note 49, ¶69.  
80 Angell-Hansen, supra note 69, ¶676. 
81 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Lesotho, ¶62, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/15/7 (Jun. 16, 2010), [hereinafter Lesotho].  
82 Hisham Badr (Vice-President & Rapporteur), Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Council on its Fourteenth Session, ¶593, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/37 (Oct. 23, 2012). 
83 Artucio, supra note 57, at ¶997.  
84 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Liberia, ¶50, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/16/3 (Jan. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Liberia].  
85 Id.  
At the HRC plenary session, Liberia explained that FGM is a “deep- rooted traditional 
practice [and] still shrouded in myth and secrecy. Often, discussions of both are strongly 
resisted and perceived as attempts to destroy the cultural and traditional heritage of the 
country . . . it is currently unable to take a position on recommendation relating to female 
genital mutilation.”86 This statement indicates that whilst Liberia was committed to taking 
measures to eliminate FGM, such action was contingent to respecting the cultural rights to 
engage in “non harmful” cultural/traditional practices. This point of discussion then turns on 
the definition of “harm” as interpreted by Liberia. Indeed, if Liberia considered some forms 
of FGM to be “non harmful”, then the statement indicates that the State will consider it to fall 
within the cultural right of the citizens, which ought to be respected.  
In this way, whilst Liberia and Mali did not use culture to explicitly justify the 
practice, both States used the association between FGM and culture to explain why the 
practice continued to exist in the respective States under review. I argue that this explanation 
at the HRC session, together with the fact that both recommendations were noted, gives 
reason to suggest that Liberia and Mali implicitly challenged the suggested reforms to enact 
laws against the practice on the basis that the cultural nature of the practice hindered the 
implementation and acceptance of such laws.  
Overall, it can be noted that the majority of recommendations that were issued to 
States under this category were accepted. Of these, eleven out of the total eighteen States 
responded by drawing attention to non-punitive policies that were already implemented to 
address the practice of FGM. Thus, regardless of the official position in response to the 
recommendations, the essence of the comments issued by the States under review was that 
long-term policies were in place at domestic level to address the practice.  
iv. Comply with international obligations on FGM 
Under this category of recommendations, observer States suggested that the States 
under review should take measures against FGM to ensure compliance with the State’s 
international obligations in relation to the practice. A typical example is when Mali was 
issued with a recommendation by Canada to ‘take the necessary measures to implement the 
recommendations of CEDAW and the Human Rights Committee concerning…FGM’.87 A 
total of twelve States under review were issued with a recommendation under this category.  
                                            
86 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Liberia Addendum, ¶10, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/3 Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011), [hereinafter Liberia Addendum].  
87 Mali, supra note 56, at ¶27. 
A total of ten States under review accepted the recommendations issued to it in 
relation to FGM under category 4. Of these, Chad, Guinea Bissau, Senegal, and Ghana 
accepted the recommendation and provided no further comments, and therefore provided an 
A1 response. Iraq provided an A2 response stating that laws against the practice were already 
in place.88 The nature of the response provided by Burkina Faso was a combined A2 and A4 
response, as the State insisted that measures were in place “to enlist the support of traditional 
leaders. Female Genital mutilation was punishable by law.”89 On the other hand, the 
comments made by Ethiopia90, Sierra Leone, Cameroon91 and Djibouti92 were categorised as 
an A4 response. A typical example of this response was when Sierra Leone stated that whilst 
“the Government accepted in principle that the practice ought to be abolished, but recalled 
that some traditions were deeply rooted and pleaded for implementation on a progressive 
basis.”93  
On the other hand, two States under review noted the recommendations issued to 
them under this category. First, Malawi provided an N6 response, as it explained that 
“Malawi did not have female genital mutilation, which had never been practiced there.”94 On 
the other hand, Mali provided a combined response of N4/N5, as it stated whilst awareness 
raising campaigns against FGM were in place, the cultural nature of the practice was the 
reason why it continued to exist in the State.95  
Overall, when observer States drew upon the States’ international human rights 
obligations in relation to FGM, the majority of the States under review accepted the 
recommendation. Of the States that provided additional statements with its official response, 
the essence of the majority of the comments was that laws and/or gradual reform policies 
were being implemented at domestic level to address FGM.  
V. Discussion on the Findings of FGM in the First Cycle of the UPR process 
Of the 205 recommendations that were issued on FGM in the first cycle of the review 
process, a total of 199 recommendations were accepted. In the first instance, one may 
conclude that the vast number of recommendations being accepted indicates two things: first, 
                                            
88 Iraq, supra note 73, ¶48. 
89 Hum. Rts. Council., Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Burkina Faso, ¶63, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/10/80 (Jan. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Burkina Faso].  
90 Ethiopia, supra note 47, ¶41.  
91 Cameroon, supra note 46, ¶24. 
92 Djibouti, supra note 66, ¶34. 
93 Sierra Leone, supra note 62, ¶26.  
94 Malawi, supra note 54, ¶77. 
95 Mali, supra note 56, 27. 
that there is a consensus amongst States that FGM should be eliminated and second, that the 
discourse held on the issue in the review process was relatively contentious in nature.  
However, an analysis of the nature of the positions adopted by States during the 
discussions reveals how some States grappled with the inherent relationship between FGM 
and culture. In total, fifty-seven States, in its capacity as observer States or States under 
review, recognised the association between FGM and culture during discussions held in the 
first cycle. However, on appreciating the association between culture and FGM, the 
participating States then went on to adopt one of the three different positions during State 
reviews.  
First, the observer States that issued recommendations under the first category 
expressly declared FGM to be a harmful cultural practice that was required to be eliminated. 
From the nature of the recommendations under this category there are two implicit 
suggestions made by the observer States. The statements indicate that the observer States 
believed that FGM continued to be practiced due to justifications that were embedded in 
some aspects of cultural belief systems.  
Second, that the observer States are at the outset making clear that the continuance of 
the practice, despite being condoned by some cultural values and traditions, is in violation of 
international norms and thus should be eliminated. This indicates that observer States issuing 
recommendations under the first category adopted a position that resonates with the strict 
universalist position. This is because strict universalists, whilst recognising that cultural 
differences exist, insist that universal human rights norms should transcend cultural 
idiosyncrasies.96 Similarly, in the UPR process, observer States issuing recommendations 
under the first category, whilst recognising the inherent relationship between FGM and 
culture, insisted that the international norms should transcend these cultural particularities, 
and thus, the practice should be eliminated.  
The implications of the strict universalist position adopted by some observer States 
during the discussions of FGM becomes apparent when one analyses the underlying 
presumptions of the States adopting this position. To begin with, the essence of the 
recommendations issued under the first category is that whilst observer States recognised the 
cultural nature of FGM, suggestions were made to eliminate the practice. This recognition 
that FGM is embedded in some aspects of culture means that the observer States hold the 
presumption that such beliefs are formulated over a period of time. On the nature of culture, 
                                            
96 Robert Sloane, Outrelativising Relativism: A Liberal Defence of the Universality of International Human 
Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 527, 541-542 (2001).  
Clifford Geertz argues that cultural values are a synthesis of moral belief systems that are 
formulated, developed and reaffirmed over a period of time.97 In this way individuals through 
a process of “enculturation” acquire the standards, values and categories of culture 
unconsciously.98 Following this logic, any reforms to values and beliefs embedded in culture 
must be undertaken gradually over a period of time to ensure that such reforms are 
accepted.99 Therefore, reforms undertaken to discourage attitudes in favour of the practice 
cannot be undertaken in a precipitous manner, and rather require long term reform polices, 
and a constructive dialogue with relevant stakeholders in a community. 100 In light of this, 
suggestions made by observer States under the first category to precipitously eliminate the 
cultural practice of FGM indicates that the observer States have not fully appreciated the 
nature of culture and process of enculturation, which deeply embeds the sympathetic attitudes 
held by individuals towards FGM.101  
In fact, the observer States’ lack of appreciation of the nature of culture and the 
enculturation process, in relation to sympathetic attitudes towards FGM, confirms some of 
the theatrical critiques of the strict universalist position.102 For example, Dembour argues that 
the sole reliance on universalism is likely to breed moral ignorance ‘because it excludes the 
experience of the other.”103 Further, An-Na’im warns about the dangers of the “claims of 
universalism that are in fact based on the claimant’s rigid and exclusive ethnocentricity.”104  
These theoretical criticisms of strict universalism are confirmed in the underlying 
presumptions of the observer States who recommended the elimination of FGM by adopting 
a strict universalist position. This is because, despite the observer States recognising the 
cultural nature of the practice, the position of the observer State clearly indicated that the 
States under appreciated the nature of enculturation as they suggested precipitously 
eliminating the practice. Consequently, whilst the overwhelming acceptance of the 
recommendations from a strict universalist position may indicate a universal consensus on 
                                            
97 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man, in INTERPRETATIONS OF 
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the issue, the underlying assumptions held by the States give reason to question whether 
recommendations issued by observer States under the first category are realistically attainable 
in the manner suggested.  
The second significant aspect of discussions on FGM in the first cycle also emanated 
from States recognising the association between culture and FGM. However, in contrast to 
those observer States that used the link between FGM and culture to adopt a strict universalist 
position, Liberia and Mali used the same association to challenge the reforms suggested by 
observer States on the practice.105 The positions adopted by Liberia and Mali in response to 
recommendations on FGM seems problematic. Whilst neither of the two States has expressly 
adopted the strict cultural relativist position to justify FGM, it is suggested that the 
implications of the nature of the responses provided by both States means that its positions 
are open to the same profound criticism that is subject to strict cultural relativism. One of the 
most profound criticisms of strict cultural relativism is the possibility of the notion of culture 
being invoked by oppressive States to justify ‘cruel and degrading practices’ and to deflect 
international scrutiny.106 This criticism can be subject to the positions of Liberia and Mali on 
the basis that both States used the cultural association of FGM as a basis to not accept the 
suggested reforms during State reviews.  
The third position adopted by States can be described as being a more nuanced 
approach when discussing the issue of FGM and its association with culture. In total, on 
twenty-eight different instances, observer States and States under review recognized the 
significance of implementing incremental methods of reform to help modify cultural norms 
and attitudes that condone the practice. For instance, some States insisted that changes in the 
attitudes towards FGM needed to be instigated from within the culture itself. This was to be 
carried out by incorporating relevant stakeholders such as tribal chiefs, religious leaders, and 
FGM practitioners in a national dialogue as part of the reform process.107 It can be noted that 
the nature of this position was adopted by States in the discussions of all four categories of 
recommendations.  
 The nature of this discussion held amongst States affiliates with the moderate cultural 
relativist position, which aims to implement reforms in a culturally legitimate manner.108 This 
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is because one of the central premises of moderate cultural relativism is the belief that the 
only way of furthering universal human rights is to ground international human rights norms 
in cultural values and beliefs.109 One method of doing this is to undertake an internal 
discourse within the culture itself with the aim of reinterpreting certain values and beliefs, 
which are inconsistent with human rights law, to bring them in line with current international 
human rights standards.110 The fundamental aspect of such a discourse is that any reforms of 
cultural beliefs need to be undertaken from within the culture itself, by ‘internal actors,’ to 
avoid the appearance of ‘dictation by others’.111 Evidence of suggestions that affiliate this 
internal discourse were recognised by some States during discussions on FGM, who 
encouraged a constructive dialogue between relevant stakeholders with the aim of changing 
sympathetic attitudes towards the practice.  
The implications of States adopting a position that is comparable with the moderate 
cultural relativist position is that they indicate that some States in the UPR process recognise 
that international norms on FGM are more likely to be observed if such norms are 
rationalised at local level, so that the content and the goals of the norms are better understood 
by members of local societies.112 In this way, by encouraging the involvement of local 
leaders in the reform process, any suggested reinterpretations of cultural values and beliefs 
are more likely to be observed by individuals practising FGM.113 Further, evidence of States 
recognising the significance of an internal discourse on FGM indicates a substantial 
commitment by the States involved to ending the practice. This is because implementing 
policies and strategies with the aim of encouraging an internal dialogue to discourage FGM 
requires demanding levels of political, social and economic commitment, through initiatives 
such as public awareness campaigns and engaging in a dialogue with relevant stakeholders. 
By comparison, acceptance of recommendations by States to enact laws arguably requires 
less commitment than those committing to reforms based on moderate cultural relativism.  
Overall, the findings of this section reveal there was at least a formal consensus 
amongst States on the elimination of FGM, as the majority of the recommendations were 
accepted by the States. However, an analysis of the discussions reveals how the States 
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grappled with the relationship between FGM and culture. Those observer States that used the 
relationship between FGM and culture to review States from a strict universalist position 
showed that the presumptions held by States gave grounds to question the attainability of the 
recommendations issued. On the other hand, the delegates of Liberia and Mali used the same 
relationship between FGM and culture to explain the continuance of the practice. These 
positions were open to criticisms that were associated with the strict universalist positions. 
Finally, some States during the discussions used the association between FGM and culture to 
adopt a moderate cultural relativist position. This position adopted by States proved to be 
most fruitful as reforms were suggested in a manner, which recognised the cultural nature of 
the practice.    
VI. Conclusion 
The innovative and ambitious nature of the UPR process is primarily based on its 
egalitarian principles, whereby the aim of the review is to treat all States equally using highly 
formal and rigid procedures. Moreover, one of the central aims of the review process is its 
normative claim of universality of promoting and protecting all human rights in the reviews 
of States’ human rights records.114 As the findings of this investigation the majority of States, 
either explicitly or implicitly, States, at least formally by accepting the recommendations, 
adopted positions to reaffirm the jurisprudence on international women’s rights, which 
provides protection against FGM.  
However, looking beyond the formal acceptance of the recommendations, an analysis 
of the discussions held in the first cycle on the issue of FGM provides a more informative 
narrative on the nature of discussions held amongst the States on the issue. In this way, an 
analysis of the discussions reveals that despite the wide ranging formal acceptance of the 
recommendations on FGM, the claim of promoting and protecting the universality of all 
human rights can be challenged. This is because in response to in response to 
recommendations from a strict universalist position, it was found that States under review 
were overtly defensive in their responses as they either referred to existing laws and policies 
that were already in place, or justified the continuance of the practice on cultural grounds. For 
example, in relation to FGM, whilst the States did not expressly challenge the universality of 
international norms on FGM from a strict cultural relativist perspective, the implications of 
the positions adopted by Mali and Liberia were similar to that of the strict cultural relativist 
position. From this, it became clear that this fundamental aim of promoting universality of all 
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human rights UPR process is not consistently applied by all States during the State reviews in 
the first cycle of review.  
This shows that when States under review did not adhere to the international 
standards on FGM, the platform of the UPR process was utilised to voice a justification for 
the deviations of standards from the universal protection of international human rights norms 
on FGM. Thus, in answering the central question of this investigation, it is clear that the 
central aims of the UPR process to promote and protect the universality of all human rights 
norms is not consistently adhered into relation to all human rights issues and concerns, 
moreover, in relation to FGM the claim universality of women’s rights protection was 
challenged by State representatives at the discussions held by State in the UPR process. More 
specifically, some member States adopted positions that affiliated with the strict cultural 
relativist position in not only challenging reforms to align their domestic regulation of FGM 
with international norms, but also to justify FGM based on cultural and or religious norms.  
Paving a middle ground between the strict universalist and strict cultural relativist 
positions adopted by some States in the first cycle, a significant proportion of States adopted 
a position during the reviews that resonated with the moderate cultural relativist position 
during the State reviews. For example, 16 observer States suggested reforms, which can be 
interpreted as the moderate cultural relativists’ position. This is primarily because the nature 
of the suggested reforms encouraged the implementation of gradual reforms to attitudes 
sympathetic to the practice, including through a form of internal discourse on FGM. 
Similarly, on 16 different instances, the responses issued by States under review in relation to 
FGM indicated appreciation of the reforms from a moderate cultural relativist position. The 
implications of States adopting a position that affiliated with the moderate cultural relativist 
positions during the review of States on the issue of FGM is that States not only 
demonstrated a recognition of the association between FGM and culture, but also suggested 
to reforms in order to engage in an internal discourse on the issue, as well as implementing 
awareness-raising programmes, to help discourage the sympathetic attitudes in relation to the 
practices that are deeply embedded in cultural and traditional norms.  
This approach is beneficial because not only have the States acknowledged the 
relationship between culture and FGM, but have recognised the significance of suggesting 
reforms that are culturally legitimate to ensure compliance with international human rights 
norms.115 Evidence of this was shown in the discussions as where there was evidence of some 
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s adopting a moderate cultural relativist position, these lines of discussions were more fruitful 
as States recognised the need to engage in an internal discourse with those that sympathise 
with the practice to help eliminate it.  
There are two main conclusions that can be drawn based on the findings and 
discussions of this investigation.  
To begin with, the UPR process is a peer review nature of the review process means 
that there will be a unique composition of State participants that will undertake the review for 
each member State. As the findings of this investigation shed light on the fact that State 
representatives are willing to use the international platform of the UPR process to challenge 
the universality of human rights if the State does not share the universal claim in relation to 
the particular issue. Following from this, the promotion and protection of universal human 
rights is also contingent on the human rights issue that is the focus of discussions during State 
reviews. As evident from the findings of this investigation, the universality of women’s rights 
protection against FGM has been implicitly challenged by State representatives during their 
reviews in the first cycle of the UPR process both in the form of simply not accepting the 
recommendations, and in some cases, expressly justifying the continuous of the practice on 
cultural and religious grounds. This in turn means that the nature of discussions during the 
interactive dialogue stage, that form the focus of all State reviews, will change and adapt 
depending on the States participating in the reviews and, more importantly, the human rights 
issue being discussed. Naturally, this means that the extent to which the embedded 
universalist claims of promoting all human rights norm is met will vary not only between 
State reviews, but also, within the lines of dialogue in relation to the specific human rights 
issue itself. In the same way, the extent of the challenge from a degree of cultural relativism 
will similarly vary depending on the State being reviewed and the human rights issue at 
stake. Consequently, despite the universalist claims that are embedded in the fundamental 
aim of the UPR process of promoting universality of all human rights norms, and, indeed, in 
the name of the process itself, the findings of this project give reason to question the 
overarching universalist aims and principles on the basis that the nature of each State review 
is unique in nature as it will be formed depending on the participants of the State review and 
the human rights issues discussed. 
The second conclusion of this investigation emanates from the challenge of strict 
cultural relativism that was raised by some States in the discussions held on FGM in the first 
cycle of reviews. The findings of this project not only adds weight to the significance of the 
cultural relativist critique of international human rights law, but the context in which the 
cultural relativist perspective was raised shows how profound the theory is in practice. For 
instance, the States of Mali and Liberia adopted positions that had implications that were 
similar to the strictest form of cultural relativism to challenge the universality of human 
rights on an international human rights platform at the U.N. in a process, which repeatedly 
asserts its aim of promoting the universality of all human rights. In addition, the strict cultural 
relativist position was raised in a setting where one may have anticipated that State 
representatives would have exercised a diplomatic attitude in light of the international and 
political pressure that it imposed on the UPR process due to its inherent political nature.  
Therefore, despite the repeated assertion of the universalist aims of the UPR process, 
and the review process being subject to an international spotlight, it was striking to note that 
States expressly challenged reforms to comply with international women’s rights on an 
international platform such as the UPR process, rather than remain silent on the issue. This 
gives reason to suggest that some States perceive the UPR process to be more than a 
monitoring mechanism, and rather a platform to express the discontent with some 
international human rights norms in relation to women’s rights issues. 
Leading from the implicit challenge from a strict cultural relativist position on the 
platform of the UPR process, what was also striking to note was that the States themselves 
were not held accountable for their challenge to the universality of international women’s 
rights. This silence by the observer States in response to an implicit challenge to the 
universality of human rights norms from a strict cultural relativist perspective gives reason to 
question whether the States participating in the reviews are committed to promoting the 
universality of all human rights, as provided in the founding resolution of the review process. 
More fundamentally, if a challenge from a strict cultural relativist position is expressed in a 
sustained manner in the second cycle and beyond, and the observer States remain silent and 
refrain from holding the State to account, then this could result in having wider ramifications 
to the universality of women’s rights protection. This is primarily because an unchecked 
challenge to the universality of women’s rights on an international platform such as the UPR 
process, may in fact undermine the universality of the particular women’s rights obligations 
when raised on different platforms, whether that be on UN treaty bodies, advocated by NGOs 
or in the national jurisprudence. 
These conclusions provide a significant contribution to enhancing the understanding 
of how the UPR process operates in practice by providing a unique insight into of the manner 
in which discussions are undertaken during State reviews. Whilst these conclusions can be 
significantly grounded on the findings of this project, what cannot be overlooked is that one 
of the obvious limitations of this study is that it focuses on only one out of the fifty-two 
human rights issues that were raised in the first cycle of the UPR process. It cannot be denied 
that the UPR process is a mechanism that will produce a colossal number of documents that 
will inform the jurisprudent of international human rights law. As a result, a full 
understanding of the UPR process is not the work of one project, but rather an on-going 
project of research in itself. Nevertheless, the findings of this investigation are significant 
because they provide reasons to suggest that there is a serious and significant challenge being 
raised to the universalist claim of the UPR process from a cultural relativist perspective 
during State reviews in the first cycle of the process. It has been argued in the literature that 
the outcomes of the UPR process can potentially be significant enough to be considered as 
contributing to the international human rights law itself. However, if such gravity and 
importance is given to those outcomes where States show evidence of consensus on 
international human rights protection, then similar grave concern should be raised when 
States challenge the universality of international human rights norms on the UPR process.  
On this basis, it seems essential to undertake further exploration of the UPR process 
with a particular focus on the universalist claim of the review process, and the significant and 
serious challenge raised by States from a cultural relativist perspective to the universality of 
other international human rights norms. If nothing else, this is particularly necessary as a 
sustained and unchecked challenge to the universality of international human rights norms on 
an international platform like the UPR process could potentially have wider ramifications for 
the international human rights infrastructure itself. Such research seems particularly apt as the 
second cycle of this innovative review process which will complete the second cycle of 
review this year.  
 
